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SEMI-DEMOCRACY IN MALAYSIA! PRESSURES AND
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE*
William Case
Political analysts appear increasingly to agree on the procedural and normative worth
of democracy as a way of organizing political relations. Many have also become
confident that where it has recently been established, democracy will persist, and that
democratic regime change may occur in more countries. Accordingly, investigations
have focussed upon facilitative conditions, transitional processes, and features of
democratic consolidation. Case studies of change from often harsh authoritarianism
in Southern Europe and South America, has shown that a wide variety of leadership
patterns, social structures, and developmental levels can intersect within short or long
time frames to produce regime opening. The transformation of totalitarian rule in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has unveiled additional contexts in which such
change can take place, thereby strengthening the sense of democracy's inevitability. 1
Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that movement from a category of 'semi-', 'quasi-
', or 'limited' democracies toward greater regime openness is desirable and readily
attainable.
In this article, I draw upon Malaysia's political record, first to examine 'semi-
democracy' more closely than is usually done in discussions of regime change.
Secondly, I assess somerecent socio-economic trends and political calculations that
haveimplied further, perhaps even rapid democratization. I conclude by presenting
some evidence which suggests that Malaysia's semi-democracy is stable in its
present limited form, and that, in contrast to many countries that have recently
undergone regime change, it may persist unchanged for a considerable period.
* This paper is a revised version of one presented at a seminar entitled 'What is
Limited Democracy? Reflections on the Malaysian Case' (Australian National
University, DepartmentofPolitical and Social Change, 26 June, 1992). I would like
to thank Professor John Higley and Dr Harold Crouch for their comments on an
earlier draft.
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Semi-democracy in Malaysia
Malaysia has consistently attracted mere scholarly attention than its relative size or
strategic importance might seem to merit For many observers, its most interesting
feature has been its bifurcated societal make-up, the stark segmentation between
'indigenous' Malays and Overseas Chinese and the close juxtaposition of their
different, even incompatible, subcultures (Pye 1985:248). This plural condition was
formed under British immigration policies during colonial rule, and it was concret
ized in an ethnic division of labour and benefits (Kessler 1992:14041). Put very
simply, the British recruited Malay aristocrats into the state bureaucracy while
confining the Malay mass publics in peasant agriculture, and they permitted Chinese
entrepreneurs to gain control over much domestic capital while channelling their
ethnic followings into tin mining and urban artisanry. This approach has often been
adjudged as a colonial strategy of 'divide and rule', deliberately fostering grave
contradictions within and between native elite and mass populations (see, for ex
ample, Jomo 1988). It should follow men that with the removal of colonial rule, local
tensions would erupt in a range of political, economic, and social conflicts.
But while Malaysia's pluralist tensions are intrinsically interesting, it is the
overall avoidance of conflict despite these deep cleavages that raises the country's
analytical importance. This record is further distinguished by Malaysia's overall
practice of at least semi-democratic politics. It can therefore be argued that British
colonialism served less to divide Malaysia's elites over ethnic differences and
organizational roles than to link them in a 'tradition of accommodation' and to
ground them in principles of consultation and representativeness (Lijphart 1977;
Weiner 1987). Some authors suggest that by placing Malay aristocrats in colonial
bureaucracies, their regional loyalties and family rivalries were moderated with a
new sense of corporate identity (Johan 1984:viii). Further, by convening Malay
elites alongside Chinese business leaders in various federal and state councils, they
were encouraged to undertake cooperative policy-making across ethnic lines
(Sadka 1968). During gradual decolonization in the 1950s, these elites were
collectively introduced to elections as a way ofcompeting for governing posts and
state power, thereby extending representativeness to mass publics. Finally, because
decolonization was peacefully carried out, the accommodative tradition was left
intact among Malaysia's elites, disposing them to perpetuate regime stability and
electoral procedures after independence.
However, though stability and elections have been consistent features of
Malaysian politics since independence, the regime cannot be classified as fully
democratic. Rather, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its
successor, the UMNO (Baru), have dominated shifting coalitions of ethnic parties
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in order to remain perennially in power. Equipped with state resources, UMNO-led
governmentshavebroadly dispensed patronage in order to avoid defeat at elections ,
and they have often forcibly dampened public criticism of their activities between
those elections. O'Donnell and Schmitter's ( 1 986a) discussion ofthe distinct though
relatedroles ofliberalization anddemocratizationhelps toelaboratethesetechniques.
They describe dictablanda ('soft' dictatorship) as political liberalism without full
democracy, the state's tolerating the formation of opposition parties and interest
groups even as it closes off electoral routes and lobbying channels to state power.
Conversely, democradura ('hard' democracy) involves democratic procedures
without liberalization, the state's scrupulously calling elections while preventing
opposition elements from organizing effectively to contest them. In Malaysia, state
elites have interwoven aspects of both approaches, offering a synthesized, durable
pattern of semi-democracy.
In terms of the regime's liberal dimension, the Home ministry, acting through
the registrar of societies, has generally permitted opposition parties, occupational
associations, and cause-oriented groups to form and canvass reasonable levels of
membershipor support. Moreover, theseorganizations havebeen able in legislative
arenas and popular forums to raise mass grievances to which the government has
sometimes been obliged to respond. But the government has also responded by
weakening these organizations, circumscribing theircapacity to mobilize intense or
broad-based followings that would empower them seriously to influence public
policy-making. This has involved habitual recourse to emergency powers, sedition
acts, detention orders, and restrictions upon assembly and communication. In short,
while 'civil society' has enjoyed some organizational autonomy, its leaders have
largely beenbarredfromusing it to shapepolicy outputs. The result in Malaysia has
been an evident though tightly contained political liberalism.
With respect to democratic procedures, the government has regularly called
elections at federal and state levels, and balloting and counting procedures have
been fairly performed. It is also significant that most political parties and interest
groups have elected their officers through general assemblies, thereby seeming to
deepen Malaysia's democratic commitments. In these circumstances, opposition
parties have strongly contested elections, even defeating individual government
candidates. On the other hand, they have been prevented systematically from
gaining enough seats to form a new federal government. Electoral competitiveness
has been checked through severe malapportionment of districts, hurried campaign
periods, bans on open-air opposition rallies, and the government's uninhibited use
of media outlets, state facilities, and on-the-spot development grants—practices
which the Electoral Commission has generally left unchallenged.2 Many analysts
thus contend that UMNO-led governments have only agreed to hold regular
elections because they have not, except in 1969, been greatly inconvenienced by
them (Tregonning 1967; Crouch forthcoming). Accordingly, electoral uncertainty
seldomhas ranged beyond questions about the government's retaining its two-thirds
majority in parliament, its enlarged or reduced margins of victory, popular vote
totals, and by-election performances.
In sum, politics in Malaysia have been classified as semi-democratic because
the government undermined opposition parties and interest groups, and prevented
elections from evolving into a reliable means by which to transfer state power.
Opposition parties thus served mainly as safjgfy_ya]vfts for societal Hisrrmtpintg,
rather than as organizations able to mobilize discontented followings into strong
claims on state positions and policy-making. However, this is not to suggest that the
terms ofMalaysia's semi-democracy, though heavily skewed, were utterly without
meaning. Seeking topreserve the 'feedbackmechanisms ' that authoritarianregimes
often lack (Huntington 1991), UMNO-led governments conducted elections in
order periodically to measure and re-energize their levels of mass support. Mass
publics, for their part, were able to deliver up or withhold their support, but even in
the latter instance they did less to weaken the government than validate its
unshakeable hold on state power. After winning elections, the UMNO and its
coalitionpartners wereable to assert withsomeplausibility that theyheld office with
majoritarian approval, even while extending scope for registering dissent LeeKam
Hing and Michael Ong thus conclude that for the government, ' the electoral system
[was] a mechanism that return[ed] it regularly to power, legitimate^] its rules,
supplie[d] a semblance of multiracial cooperation, and offer[ed] its own members
involvement and participation' (Lee and Ongl987:141).
On the other side, though some opposition leaders publicly criticized the
regime's undemocratic aspects, many appeared to accept them, harbouring few
ambitions beyond strengthening their followings to the extent allowable. Discus
sions with some of Malaysia's opposition leaders in mid 1988 gave the impression
that they were geared to continuing in opposition, and that they were themselves
unconvinced about their ability to operate an effective federal government. The
Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), a largely ethnic Malay party, showed little practical
notion about how to realize its aim to create an Islamic state, and the Democratic
Action Party (DAP), made up primarily of 'non-Malays', was better able to
denouncegovernment policies than articulate separate visions. But totheextent that
liberal and democratic features were present in Malaysia, opposition leaders found
that their political rights were respected. This enabled them to express dissent
through party meetings and publications, hold the government in some degree
accountable through international networks and the foreign press, and sometimes
even to win control of state assemblies. They could claim also that by competing
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with the government in these arenas, they insured that the state displayed some
responsiveness to mass sentiments, inducing it to make some policy concessions
and to deepen patronage flows. Lee and Ong suggest that 'the opposition may
complain that the system is designed to defeat its interests and that there is no way
for it to win power; but the same group does not see any acceptable alternative and
is resigned to the fact that the opposition will remain the opposition' (ibid.)An short,
though opposition leaders were seriously hobbled, they won enough benefits to
assess the game as worth staying iaj/'
Pressures for fuller democracy
In 1988, however, the ruling UMNO split into two parties, the UMNO (Baru) (New
UMNO), which remained in power under Prime Minister Mahathir, and the
Semangat '46 (Spirit of '46) which went into opposition under the former Finance
minister, Tengku Razaleigh.3 Thus, mounting factionalism within the government
gave way to more open and wider-ranging competitions that culminated in the 1990
general election. In many countries, these events might arise from and exacerbate
disunity among state elites, thus causing regime instability and the breakdown of
democracy. But in Malaysia, there were reasons for thinking that elites would persist
in their overall tradition of accommodation, and mat they would determine their
relative standings through more robust democratic procedures. Let us consider some
of these socio-economic, political, and even external reasons for optimism.
First, in very general terms, social scientists have long posited a causal
relationship between economic growth, more complex social structures, and new
bases for political democracy. Economic growth andurbanization enlarge 'middle-
class' populations, while heightened educational levels modernize their attitudes,
leaving them less in awe of ascriptive statuses and patterns of deference.4 Hence,
many members of the middle class, accustomed to making their own career,
business, and consumer decisions, seek fuller 'citizenship rights' (Dahrendorf
1988) and the power collectively to choose or replace their governing leaders.
Moreover, this process can be hastened if, after prolonged growth, the middle class
is threatened by state policy failings and economic downturn. O'Donnell and
Schmitter ( 1986b:20) observe that in Brazil, for example, many owners ofdomestic
capital faced shrinking markets during the early 1970s, and they consequently
sought to ward offcompetitionfrom stateenterprises set up during the authoritarian
period by supportingdemocracy's return. In thePhilippines during the 1980s,many
business groupswhohadbeenexcludedbyMarcos's 'cronyism'called similarlyfor
democracy in the hope of re-establishing more favourable state linkages. Thus, in
a twist upon James C. Davies's explanation for revolution (Davies 1962), it can be
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argued that middle classes in late-developing countries, having benefitted and been
made assertive by state-organized prosperity, may re-evaluate the state as less the
guarantor than an obstacle to theirprosperity. In this situation, themiddleclass seeks
not to revolt, but to democratize, as it actively presses for regime openness.
In Malaysia, the UMNO-led government used state power to intervene in the
economy after 1970, implementing an amalgam of import-substitution, export-
oriented, and heavy industrialization strategies that, despite somemuch-publicized
losses, fostered fairly high growth rates until 1985. The government was thus able
to recruit bureaucratic managers into new state enterprises and to promote new
businessmen with state contracts and licences, thereby rapidly expanding the
middle class. But having beennurtured through deliberate state patronage, much of
this middle class expressed disillusion with theUMNO leadership when, during the
198S-87 recession, the patronage ran short
Articulating middle-class bitterness over exclusion and bankruptcies, Tengku
Razaleigh challenged Prime Minister Mahathir for the presidency of the UMNO at
theparty's 1987 general assembly election. Although Razaleigh was defeated in this
election, hepersisted inhis challenge, causing theUMNOto split in 1988. AsHarold
Crouch notes, this outcome is best understood 'as a struggle for power and position
[in which] ideological and policy differences...played almost no part' (Crouch
1992:30). Yet in heading the Semangat '46 party, Razaleigh sought to upgrade
middle-class grievances into a call for democracy, thereby ennobling his campaign
against Mahathir for national leadership. What is more, Razaleigh assured middle-
class followings that a two-party system, government accountabililty, and an
independent judiciary would serve not only to level the playing field, but make it
greener as well, ridding the policy-making process of favouritisim and wastage.
Taking these events together, one could expect that the growth in Malaysia of a
sizeable, increasingly assertive middle class, its profound disappointment with the
incumbent UMNO government's narrowing largesse, and the emergence of a
dynamic, alternative national leader campaigning explicitly for democracy would
combine to exert strong pressures for further regime opening.
Secondly,opendemocratic competitionsbecomemoreviable inplural societies
whenethnic sentiments areeased. Withoutentering intodiscussionoftheprimordial,
rational, or shifting impetuses for ethnic affiliation, it is safe to say that ethnic
communities in plural societies benefit unevenly from economic growth, and that
this exacerbates their suspicions, jealousies, and disparate perceptions of 'group
worth' (Enloe 1986; Horowitz 1985; Jesudason 1989). Hence, when material
imbalances grow severe, the receptiveness of ethnic communities to chauvinistic
appeals is increased. Further, under a democraticregime that allows free speech and
assembly, competing elites may be more tempted to make such appeals, perhaps
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even arousing mass publics to violence. For these reasons, Arend Lijphart (1977)
concludes that democracy can only be maintained in plural societies if elites
cooperate in undermobilizing, perhaps even rectifying, deep ethnic tensions. This
usually involves elites forming a multi-ethnic 'grand coalition' and apportioning
resources among communities gauged through elections.
Lijphart's thesis helps illuminate the events surrounding Malaysia's important
general election in 1969, as well as the government's subsequent programmes of
inter-ethnic redistribution and societal restructuring. Under a relatively open
democratic regime, the opposition PAS campaigned for the 1969 election by
mobilizing Malay sentiments against Chinese control of the economy. In turn, the
DAPraised Chinese discontents over Malay dominance of the state apparatus. The
UMNO-ledgovernment, though retainingpower at thefederal level, lost significant
support, and in trying to recapture it some UMNO leaders triggered attacks by
Malay followings upon Chinese in Kuala Lumpur.3 Attributing the rioting that
resulted to Malay grievances over economic imbalances, theUMNO claimedmore
state power from its Chinese partner in the governing coalition, the Malaysian
Chinese Association (MCA), and it used that power to make inroads into Chinese
business activities.
Through a series ofprogrammes informally labelled theNewEconomic Policy
(NEP), the UMNO stimulated growth and enlarged the middle class. Specifically,
it bolstered the Malay segment of the middle class, directly acquiring on its behalf
many foreign and Chinese-owned companies, or tightly regulating such firms with
licensing requirements and quotas. But while this policy limited democracy further
and distorted market behaviour, it also succeeded in broadening the middle class
across ethnic lines, thus laying the basis for re-democratization and, indeed,
movement toward fullerdemocracy thanMalaysiahadhad in the past In short, after
nearly twodecades ofNEPmeasures thatalleviated theMalays ' material grievances,6
it became reasonable to assume that their ethnic sentiments would take more
tractable forms. One is not surprised to find, then, that during 1988-90, the UMNO
(Baru) and the Semangat '46 were both able to operate complex coalitions which,
while Malay-centred, featured clear cooperation among their ethnic component
parties.7 Moreover, though this activity failed to generate well-defined, class-based
outlooks and appeals, it disposed UMNO (Baru) and Semangat '46 leaders to
address rough camps of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Hence, in the period leading up
to the 1990 election, public discourse oftenfocussed productively on accountability
and access, thereby making electoral competitiveness more viable than it had been
in 1969.
A word should also be said about the specific implications for democracy of the
Chinese segment of the middle class. Diamond (1988) argues that regime openness
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can be furthered or safeguarded by societal pluralism, state elites finding it difficult
to extend authoritarian controls over diverse ethnic loyalties; but if these loyalties
grow too rigid, a democratic regime can become equally difficult to maintain. In
Malaysia, though the NEPplacatedmany ethnic Malays, it strongly alienated many
Chinese. Indeed, there is evidence that at least in the short term the NEP strength
ened ethnic Chinese sentiments, prolonging popular interest in Chinese education
and culture in a way that is not seen in other Southeast Asian countries. That such
societal resistance does not always lead to democracy is shown by the UMNO
responding during the 1970s with a restrictive National Culture Policy and by its
outlawing public criticism of Malay 'special rights'.
Over time, however, while therhetoric oftheNEPcontinued to galvanizemuch
of the Malay community, the programme's substantive implementation grew less
rigorous (see Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman 1990). Rather than confiscating
wealth from the Chinese, the NEP insured only that they collaborate with Malays
in accumulating it; while the NEPreduced Chinese autonomy in business, it did not
seriously impingeon Chinese middle-class status. These trends may therefore have
settled into the salient though manageable level of ethnic identification that
Diamond suggests favours state-society balance and democratic openness. In
particular, whilemuchoftheChinesecommunitycontinued toopposethe government
during 1988-90 through support for the DAP, it stopped well short of backing anti-
system parties or movements. At the same time, this opposition shed some of its
defensive communal character as many Chinese acclaimed the DAP's ties to the
Semangat '46. Overall then, among middle-class populations, Malay ethnic re
sentments weresoftenedby theNEP,poisingthem tocooperatemoreflexibly across
ethnic boundaries. And ethnic Chinese sentiments, while initially intensified by the
NEP, evolved gradually in ways that by the late 1980s vitalized, rather than
overloaded, democratic procedures and competitions.
When ethnic tensions are reduced, claims made by state elites that they need
strong powers with which to contain social conflict ring increasingly hollow.
Robbedofapretext for resisting regimeopening, state elites maymorereadily agree
to it, especially if it enhances the regime's domestic legitimacy and international
standing. On this score, it is notable that while economic growth and a multi-ethnic
middle class may pave the way for democracy, it is elites who determine whether
that way is cleared or closed off. Recent 'top-down' analyses of democratization
suggestthat after elites haveentered intopacts, settlements, or a spiritofgarantismo*
securing their essential interests, they may give the 'consent of the governors* that
permits regime openness. Huntington (1991:165) writes explicitly that in the late
twentieth century wave ofregime openings, 'negotiations and compromise among
political elites were at the heart of the democratization processes.' (Huntington
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classifies the interaction between state and opposition as resulting inregimechange
processes of transformation, replacement, and transplacement.) Conversely, in the
absence of such consent, elites can stave off democratic pressures for long periods,
as present-day politics in China and Burma clearly show. Moreover, even when a
faction of reforming elites makes democratic concessions to opposition leaders, a
subset of 'hardliners', 'standpatters', or 'authoritarian nostalgias ' can mount coups
through which to retract those concessions, as occurred in Thailand in 1976 and
1991. In sum, while socio-economic changes can build conditions for political
change, 'democracies are created not by causes but by causers' (ibid.:107).
Hence, a third reason for thinking that Malaysia would become more demo
cratic stems from favourable elite attitudes and patterns ofbehaviour. Specifically,
there were signs during 1988-90 that the national leader and state elites agreed to
compete democratically with an invigorated opposition. Prime Minister Mahathir,
in his capacity as Home minister, permitted Tengku Razaleigh to register the
Semangat '46 and to coalesce with the PAS, the DAP, and several smaller parties
in a web of formal alliances and informal understandings. Further, Mahathir's
UMNO (Baru)-led governmentengaged oppositionforces in a series ofby-elections
which, because their results were often genuinely uncertain, stimulated high levels
of public interest. In campaigning for these by-elections, opposition candidates
were generally denied coverage in the mainstream media. But they were permitted
to travel freely around Malaysia and to communicate with mass followings through
indoorpolitical meetings, religious functions, and a wide distribution ofvideotaped
speeches. In this way, the opposition appeared able to mobilize significant support
over perceptions ofMahathir's rash leadership style and exclusionary policies. And
when, during the final days of campaigning for the 1990 general election, the
opposition was joined by the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), a mainly ethnic Kadazan
party governing in Sabah, it even seemed conceivable that it could winenough seats
in parliament to form a new federal government.
In presiding over these events, Mahathir must be characterized as a reluctant
'swingman' charting the route to greater democratic openness. While he valued the
legitimation of his rule through electoral victory, it was not clear that he was so
committed to democratic norms that he would accept electoral defeat. Speculation
thus persists over whether if Mahathir had lost in 1990, he would have resorted to
an executive coup, and further, whether the military would have supported him in
such an action. Onecanonly outline therange ofpossibilities : Mahathirmay ormay
not havechosen to shut down the electoral process, and other state elites may either
have backed him or acted to restrain him. Of course, to get a surer sense of
Mahathir's 'true' attitudes towards elections and his willingness to lose them, it
would be interesting to replay the 1990 election in 1987 or 1988 when the effects
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of recession were still evident in Malaysia.10 But empirically, it can only be shown
that Mahathir's governmentcalled the election within the timeframe requiredby the
constitution, that voting procedures were adjudged 'free in accordance with Malay
sian law and circumstances ' (Commonwealth observer team report issued after the
1990 general elections, as quoted in The Far Eastern Economic Review [hereafter
FEER] 1 November 1990), and that electoral competitiveness was evinced by
opposition victories in two state assemblies. Thus, while Mahathir is often depicted
as a loose cannon and wrecker of institutions, one can as easily portray him as
competing actively for state power against strong opposition forces, even as the
regime's democratic rules came more firmly into play. In this interpretation,
whatever Mahathir's personal calculations and the dynamic between himself and
state elites, his apparent willingness to abide by these democratic rules can be
construed as heralding movement toward fuller democracy.
Lastly, though external or international factors perform during peacetime only
a secondary role in regime change, they may tip or reinforce elite decision-making
in finely balanced junctures (Whitehead 1986:20). In these circumstances, state
elites may bedrawn to democratic models bynormativeconsiderations, or theymay
respond to material incentives offered by influential trading partners. In Spain, for
example, democratization was facilitated by both concerns as the country took its
place in the European Community. In South America and Eastern Europe, regime
openings cumulated in demonstration effects thatover time embracedmostofthese
geographic regions. Moreover, in several African countries, national leaders rec
ognized that their one-party systems were inconsonant with world trends, perhaps
contributing to their adoption ofmore open democratic procedures which resulted
occasionally in changes of government
While thesecasesproliferated around the world, Malaysia also confronted some
lessons closertohomethatmayhaveadvanced its progresstowardregimeopenness.
In 1987, highly competitive presidential elections wereheld in South Korea, and the
opposition gained control of the parliament in the following year. During the same
period, state elites in Taiwan liberalized constraints on political organization and
committed themselves to full (if slow) democratization (Huntington 1991 -23). On
the other hand, PresidentMarcos 's downfall in the Philippines revealed the costs of
state elite disunity, the exclusion ofpowerful business groups, and the repression of
mass aspirations. Further, while state elites in China and Burma succeeded in
crushing these aspirations and clinging to state power, their brutality gave little
cause for emulating their methods and regime forms—especially when one takes
into account the traditionally forgiving quality of Malaysia's political life. Hence,
during 1988-90 external factors and lessons might seem, if anything, to have
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quickened the intentionality of state elites in Malaysia to democratize (or at least
to acquiesce in democratization).
In summary, with only a briefhiatus from 1969 to 1 97 1 , Malaysia possessed for
three decades a stable, though semi-democratic regime characterized by low levels
of electoral competitiveness. But during this period elites also adopted economic
growth strategies that enlarged the middle class, and they undertook redistributive
policies thatmade its composition multi-ethnic. These socio-economic trends could
beexpectedtoproduceviabledemands for greaterregime openness, especially after
the contraction of state patronage during the mid-1980s that sparked middle-class
grievances. Ofcourse, elites can, if they choose, use state power to put down such
grievances, either through simple coercion or by reversing some of the societal
changes they have effected. But if they consider that their statuses and interests are
safeguarded enough that they can survive electoral defeats, and ifethnic sentiments
have abated enough that elections can be peacefully held, they may consent to
regime opening. This calculation would appear to be strongly encouraged by
contemporary demonstration effects. For primarily these reasons then (though for
others as well—such as British colonial tutelage and past experience with fuller
democracy), onecould reasonably claim during Malaysia's 1990 election campaign
that state elites were effectively democratizing their regime form.
Non-democratic outcomes
While objective societal conditions and state elite actions might have led to this
reading, they appear now to have combined in little more than a brief spike in
Malaysia's limited democratic record. Recent field study suggests that pressures for
regime opening began to subside even before the 1990 election, and that elite consent
has been steadily withdrawn in its aftermath. Let us briefly reconsider, then, the
societal and elite-level factors enumerated above, as well as Malaysia's evident
repudiation of demonstration effects.
During the late 1980s, direct foreign investment and improved commodity
prices launched Malaysia on a dramatic economic recovery. This enabled the
UMNO (Baru) to replenish its patronage funds and reincorporate bureaucratic
managers and businessmen,revealing thatmiddle-class Malays were less interested
in mounting strong political opposition than sharing in boom cycles (Khoo Kay Jin
1992:73). Thus, by the time the 1990 elections were held, the Malay middle class
felt little need to change the government—and even less to press for regime change
that would in future elections make regular, democratic changes of government
possible. On this score, ODonnell and Schmitter record that 'high economic
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conjuncture' presents a paradox. It appears on first blush to offer congenial soil for
democratization, easing many of the mass grievances that can quickly overburden
new and fragile democratic procedures. In such circumstances, reforming state
elites appear more able to navigate an orderly transition. But hardlining elites are
also able to boast of their policy achievements, effectively dispersing mass pres
sures for democracy with fresh economic opportunities. Thus, in the moment that
mass tensions are reduced and regime opening becomes viable, hardlining elites
may exploit widespread indifference to insure that 'a golden opportunity' is lost
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986b: 16).
As discussedabove,TengkuRazaleigh drewupon Malay discontents generated
during the mid 1980s in order to ready the opposition for the 1990 elections. His
campaign even featured some short bursts of great optimism, especially after
gaining the cooperation of the PBS. Looking back, however, these expectations
obscured the steady slippage in Razaleigh's support that had set in with economic
recovery. Accordingly, though Razaleigh's coalition partner, the PAS, managed
through its Islamic appeals to improve its customary vote levels, the Semangat '46's
democratizing agenda was finally spurned by the middle class. The party thus
performed surprisingly poorly at the polls and afterward suffered a stream of
defections to the UMNO (Baru). Indeed, observers suggest that to the extent that
Razaleigh did win support, it was ascribable more to bis traditional princely status
than tohis democratic message. ThenewMalaymiddle class understood democracy
less as strengthening civil society against the state apparatus than as enabling
outsiders to regain access to state patronage. Once this was accomplished, demo
cratic values—and their advocates—were swiftly discarded.11
With respect to the Chinese segment of Malaysia's middle class, I have
suggested that its lingering ethnic identity, tempered by middle-class sensitivities,
posed an assimilabledemocratizing force. However,just asmuchMalay opposition
fervour was quelled during this period by renewed patronage flows, so too was
Chinese political participation overshadowed by new business pursuits. Under
standings between the Semangat '46 and the DAPhad initially stirred much interest
in the Chinese community, adumbrating a new governing coalition which, though
Malay-centred, promised an enhanced Chinese role. But the importance of this
coalition diminished as the incumbent UMNO (Baru) oversaw economic growth
that benefitted both middle-class Malays and Chinese. Thus, in the 1990 election,
though the Chinese registered perfunctory protest by voting for DAP candidates at
thefederal level, they often soughtto insurelocal prosperitybyreturninggovernment
candidates in the state assemblies (see inFEER 5 [Michael Vatikiotis] March 1992).
To conclude, it is probably wrong to suggest that by turning out an incumbent
government at first chance, voters in all cases better promote democratization than
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by retaining that government in office. The election ofthe opposition PopularUnity
leader, Salvador Allende, as president of Chile in 1970 surely weakeneddemocracy
in that country, rattling other state elites and provoking severe regime closure. On
the other hand, the election in Korea in 1987 of the existing military government's
choice for president, RohTaeWoo, doubtless advanced important regime opening.
But while analysts should thus guard against conflating government turnover and
democratization, most would still agree with Huntington (1991:8) that 'the sus
tained failure of the major opposition political party to win office necessarily raises
questions concerning the degree of competition permitted by the system'. In other
words, it is only by supporting the opposition that middle-class attitudes toward
democracy are revealed and the resilience of democratic procedures can be tested.
Hence, in the Malaysian case, observers must await evidence that Malay and
Chinese middle-class values are cumulating in significant pressures for democracy.
Meanwhile, one can appreciate why Robison suggests in his study of authoritarian
politics in Southeast Asia that 'the middle class has neither been internally
consistent in its political stance nor unambiguously democratic in its actions'
(Robison ['Introduction'] forthcoming). Indeed, he states, the very concept of the
middle class is sorely in need of theorizing.
Butwhileanewmiddleclass, howeverconceptualized,may bemadeindifferent
by prosperity to the need for an opposition, it may also attach less importance to
ethnic appeals. I have argued that in these circumstances, democratic procedures
become more viable, and their adoption may therefore become more probable. A
deeperassessmentofthe post-1988 period in Malaysia, however, suggests thateven
though ethnic sentiments are benign among prospering middle-class populations in
urban areas, they are still easily inflamedamongrural populations less benefitted by
economic growth. During most of the campaign for the 1990 election, the UMNO
(Baru) hesitated to exploit this feature. To do so would have belied its claim,
embodied in its multi-ethnic coalition, that it was committed to national unity and
tolerance—therebyunderminingits tactical overtures to Chinesevoters. Additionally,
it would have bred new uncertainties, possibly erupting in public disorder and
shaking foreign investors. But when in the last days of the campaign the UMNO
(Baru) seemed suddenly to risk losing the election unless it re-energized Malay
support, it resorted to issuing potent ethnic appeals.
Specifically, when thePBSjoined the opposition, theUMNO(Baru) portrayed
the PBS's cooperation with Razaleigh as a threat to 'Malay dominance'. This
involved the heavy useofparty- and state-owned media outlets to depict a Kadazan
head-dress worn by Razaleigh while campaigning in Sabah as a bishop's mitre
marked by a Christian cross (PEER 1 November 1990). My impression formed
during fieldwork is that though this and other ruses failed to sway urban audiences
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(and may even have repelled them), traditional Malay desires for state protection
were awakened in many rural parts of the country. On the other side, because
Semangat '46 candidates were associated with the DAP, they hadmore consistently
to eschew ethnic strategies during the campaign. But since the election they have
experimented with them in Malay village settings and found the response to be
'fantastic* (interview with Semangat '46 by-election candidate, 13 February 1992).
Moreover, in applying this logic at the national level, Tengku Razaleigh has
denounced the government's 'growth triangle' project linking the southern state of
Johor with Singapore and Batam as a scheme to relocate Hong Kong Chinese in
Malaysia before the colony is retaken by China (Straits Times 4 June 1991).
In sum, ethnic identity persists in Malaysia as a strong basis for social
attachment. Ethnic suspicions remain deep-seated among rural populations, and a
fragility of inter-ethnic tolerance could probably be demonstrated even in urban
areas ifeconomic growth conditions and redistributive programmes wereremoved.
However, it is not societal pluralism in itself that erodes the viability ofdemocracy
but the willingness ofelites to exacerbate and exploit it. Hence, theUMNO (Baru)-
led government may be right when it contends that a 'multiracial' country can ill
afford full democratic procedures, especially when it is itself sometimes driven by
electoral calculations tomakeethnic appeals. Ironically, the UMNO (Baru) can cite
the tensions that result as a reason for continuing to limit electoral competitiveness,
claiming that it is uniquely able to guard against recurrences of the 1969 ethnic
rioting.
The 1988-90 period was nonetheless widelyviewed as holding out the prospect
of a more competitive political party system in Malaysia. In particular, I have
suggested that the UMNO (Baru)'s allowing the opposition to organize formally
perhaps signalled the elite consent necessary for movement from semi- to full
democracy. Moreover, after having been reassured by their electoral victory, one
might have expected UMNO (Baru) leaders to submit to more open electoral tests.
O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that if an incumbent government is 'helped' to do
well in winning 'foundingelections ' at the start ofa democratic transition, its leaders
may grow secure enough about their statuses and political rights that they will
complete that transition (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986c:62). This 'help' takes the
form of district malapportionment, gerrymandering, the partisan use of state
resources, and other techniques long evident in Malaysia that are abandoned as
democratization ushers in more balanced contests.
TheUMNO (Baru)'s actions during 1991-92, however, suggest that despite its
electoral victory, it remains unconvinced about democracy's worth. Indeed, the
government has consolidated its ascendancy by rolling back in ad hoc fashion the
regime's liberal and democratic dimensions. In order to weaken opposition lead
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ership, for example, the state-ownedmedia have resumed making reports implicat
ing TengkuRazaleigh in the decade-old BMF scandal. In May 1992 the parliament
barred the DAP leader, Lim Kit Siang, from its proceedings for the rest of the year
after he challenged the president of a component party in the governing coalition
over an equities deal. After investigation by the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA),
the PBS leader of Sabah was placed on trial for petty corruption which, if resulting
in a fine of $M2000 against him, will lead to his removal as chief minister (FEER
18 June 1992). Further, in the PAS-controlled state of Kelantan, federal funding of
development projects has been slowed, and foreign investors have reportedly been
diverted to other states (FEER 23 January 1992). The government has also pro
hibited public sales of the PAS's Harakahnewspaper and the DAP's Rocket, and it
has banned outright a new Malay paper, Mingguan Waktu, evidently for declaring
Prime Minister Mahathir's ten years in office 'a failure' (FEER 9 January 1992).
Finally, many opposition MPs and state assemblymen have been induced to cross
over to the government, or they have been removed through the courts on technical
grounds and made to stand in by-elections (for example, see TheStar March 1992).
They find also that familymembersand supportersemployedby the state are subject
to sudden transfers and demotions, and that their businesses are vulnerable to
contract cancellations, licence withdrawals, and credit squeezes.12
Theserecent events contribute to theview that electoral competitiveness during
1988-90 flowed less from the government's growing commitments to democracy
than its doubts about the support of military and bureaucratic elites for any serious
abrogation ofestablishedprocedures, hi this interpretation, thegovernment calculated
that the 1990 elections involved greater risks than earlier elections, but to suspend
them was riskier still. It would follow that UMNO (Baru) leaders are either so
wedded to state power that they cannot contemplate losing it for even a single term,
or that they are not sufficiently assured about their political rights electorally to
contest and regain state positions. Put simply, the UMNO (Baru) may fear that if it
loses power, it will be treated as it has treated the opposition.
Does this refusal to democratize the regime, however, not run counter to cross-
national demonstration effects, perhaps associating Malaysia with categories of
wrongheaded or even pariah Third World countries? Prime Minister Mahathir
continues to sound the familiar theme that strong state capacity is necessary for
guiding rapid economic growth and preserving ethnic peace, and that his govern
ment must produce societal goods rather than particularistic favours. He has
buttressed this argument by raising nationalist fervour against Western models of
liberal democracy, asserting that indigenous forms of rule by consensus are
culturally more appropriate. Of course, such consensual rule often cloaks unac
countable one-party rule, and it thus poses grave risks. While authoritarian gov
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ernments in Asia's newly industrialized countries (NICs) couldclaimreasonably to
have made socio-economic gains, the political record in Burma and Cambodia
shows thatuncheckedstatepowercanbetragically misused. Accordingly, Mahathir's
leadership style has met with ambivalence in Malaysia. While it appears to resonate
strongly among mass publics during the present economic expansion, it drewmuch
criticism during the downturn in the 1980s.
To summarize, I have elaborated fourreasons for thinking that Malaysia would
become more democratic: an enlarged middle class, improved ethnic relations, a
facilitative international milieu, and an apparent elite willingness to act favourably
on these conditions. Closer investigation, however, especially of the 1991-92
period, greatly tempers one's optimism. Economic recovery cut short middle-class
interest in democracy in urban areas, and it failed to alleviate ethnic sentiments in
rural settings. Moreover, UMNO (Baru) leaders chose to mobilize these ethnic
sentiments, thereby threatening the viability of democracy just before the 1990
election; they also exploited middle-class complacency after the election by
reimposing limits on democracy. Throughout, economic recovery blunted global
demonstration effects, enabling the UMNO (Baru)-led gtovemment blithely to
dismiss democracy as a superior approach to organizing politics and markets.
Prospects for democracy
Semi-democracies straddle regime categories. They are thus frequently diagnosed as
neither here nor there and as torn by contradictory impulses. Huntington (1991:157)
suggests that a posture of liberalized authoritarianism alienates hardliners in the
governing coalition, yet fails to appease activists in civil society. Accordingly, 'the
halfway house does not stand'. Di Palma (1990:157) likewise describes such 'half
way houses [as] costly impasses' between conflicting elites, rendering them vulner
able to destabilizing crises. But it may be that if state elites are unified enough, they
can maintain a semi-democracy that possesses more intrinsic stability than 'purer'
regime forms. Specifically, semi-democracy may offer enough electoral activities
that it forges some political legitimacy, but by avoiding the policy immobilism
associated with full democracy, it may earn performance legitimacy also. This
becomes more likely if elites use their state power to build up the technocratic
commitment to developmentalism that is a feature of several countries in Southeast
Asia. In short, elites in semi-democratic settings are less bound by the systemic
constraints of authoritarianism affording them scope with which to modulate politi
cal liberalism and democratization in order to meet their shifting legitimacy needs.
This may enable them more effectively to pre-empt or resist pressures toward full
democracy than elites operating 'ideal-type' authoritarian regimes.
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But this is not to say that even semi-democracies that have attained high levels
of institutionalization under no circumstances will open further. To reiterate an
argument made earlier in this article, a middle class emerges from state-led
economic growth which, when state performance declines, may put forth demands
for additional democracy. Ofcourse, in the short term, middle-class frustrations can
be defused through another upswing in the business cycle, obviating the need for
lasting regime opening. One finds, for example, that during Malaysia's present
economic recovery, only the professional component of the middle class—in
particular the Bar Association—offers a sustained societal resistance to state
dominance.13 But over the long term, as the middle class perseveres through such
cycles and grows in size and assertiveness, its expectations may take on a more
durable participatory tone that defies semi-democratic controls. In practice, this
dynamic could come to rest in Malaysia under a regime involving the regular,
electoral replacement of one multi-ethnic, though Malay-centred, coalition by
another similarly constructed coalition.
Toreacheven this level ofcontestation,however,requires elite consent Despite
the Malaysian regime's 'semi-' or indeed halfway quality, it is hardly an unstable
regime, prodding state elites along one course or the other. It is not so much the
regime form that constrains elites as it is elites that operate the regime. Thus, while
analysts must track economic trends and social formations that can fuel democratic
pressures, theymustrecognize that it is national leaders and state elites whoapprove
any lasting progress towarddemocracy. As wehave seen, intransigent elites canuse
state power effectively to curb middle-class participation over long periods. On the
other hand, ifthey evaluate their statuses and interests as secureenough that theycan
survive electoral losses, they may ease middle-class grievances by making demo
cratic concessions.
In Malaysia, such a favourable assessmentofdemocracy's worth will probably
requirenewnational leadership. Whileonecould reasonably speculate during 1988-
90 that Prime Minister Mahathir had endorsed (or at least acquiesced in) a process
ofregime opening, his actions since 1990 indicate his reluctance to open the regime
fully. In this regard, Huntington concludes in his recent study that 'some form of
leadership change...has to precede movement toward democracy' (1991:296).
Thus, when new leadership does arise in Malaysia, it may more readily appreciate
the utility of full democratic procedures, especially as the country moves into the
upper-middle-income category of what Huntington (ibid.:3\3) terms the 'political
transition zone'.
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Notes
1 In summarizing these sentiments, Samuel Huntington (1991:58) writes that 'while authoritarian
regimes came in many forms—military government, one-party system, personal tyranny, absolute
monarchy, racial oligarchy. Islamic dictatorship—by the 1980s, they were not, by and large,
perceived as alternatives to each other. Outside of Africa and a few countries elsewhere, democracy
had come to be seen as the only legitimate and viable alternative to an authoritarian regime of any
type'.
2 Harold Crouch (forthcoming) thus concludes that 'the Malaysian electoral system....was so heavily
loaded in favor of the Government that it was hard to imagine that the ruling coalition, as long as it
remained united, could be defeated in an election'.
3 The Semangat '46 was formally registered in June 1989. "46' refers to the year in which the original
UMNO was founded.
4 I use die 'middle class' concept guardedly, seeking to avoid the brewing debate over the middle
class's precise composition, whether it is described by its relationship to the means ofproduction or
its patterns of consumption, and whether it is rural, as well as urban, and infested with sub-strata.
Further, by referring to the middle class in the 'loose, everyday sense' outlined by J.A.C. Mackie
(Mackie 1990:98), one is not theoretically barred from carrying out essentially elite-centered
analysis. For a series ofposition papers by Mackie and others that articulate much of the scholarly
confusion over the middle class and its political implications, see Tanter and Young (1990).
5 The most comprehensive account of the ethnic rioting in 1969 is presented by von Vorys (1975).
6 The NEP was evaluated as at least a 'qualified success' in terms of increasing the percentage of
corporate equity held by the Malays. See vonderMehden (1992:112).
7 von der Mehden (1991:166) writes that 'the electoral campaign itselfwas less marked by communal
emotion than has often been the case, in part because of die multiracial character ofboth coalitions'.
8 On pacts see Karl (1986). On elite settlements, see Higley and Burton (1989:17-32). Giuseppe Di
Palma ( 1990:63) elaborates the garantismo concept
9 ODoimell and Schirritter refer to 'contingent consent' in 'Convoking Elections (and Provoking Par
ties)' (1986c:59).
10 Harold Crouch (1992:39) poses this question in terms of the UMNO (Baru)'s weakened grip on
patronage resources during 1988-89.
1 1 In recent discussions and interviews in Malaysia, I regularly heard the refrain: 'a roof over our
heads, a job, a car'. The implication was that any government that could reliably fulfil these
aspirations need not be electotally challenged or held seriously accountable for its methods.
12 In an interview (16 February 1992), a Singapore journalist characterized political competition in
Malaysia as becoming much more rigorous than in the past and spilling into multiple arenas. With
reference to government treatment of political opposition supporters, he stated succinctly: 'Now,
they loll you. They loll your business. They go after your relatives.'
13 With respect to nascent middle-class pressures for regime opening in Indonesia, H. W. Dick
(1990:67) writes that 'the liberal values of democracy, rule of law and freedom of speech would
seem to be attributable specifically to the middle stratum of professionals and intellectuals'. For
recent accounts of the ongoing conflict between the Bar Association and the state-appointed Lord
President in Malaysia, seeAliran Monthly 12(3X1992).
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